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Abstract 
 
A Mobile Ad-Hoc Network is a collection of mobile nodes that are dynamically and arbitrarily located in such a 
manner that the interconnections between nodes are capable of changing on continual basis. Due to security 
vulnerabilities of the routing protocols, wireless ad-hoc networks are unprotected to attacks of the malicious 
nodes. One of these attacks is the Black Hole Attack. In this paper, we give an algorithmic approach to focus on 
analyzing and improving the security of AODV, which is one of the popular routing protocols for MANET. Our 
aim is on ensuring the security against Black hole attack. The proposed solution is capable of detecting & 
removing Black hole node(s) in the MANET at the beginning. Also the objective of this paper is to provide a 
simulation study that illustrates the effects of Black hole attack on network performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless ad-hoc networks are composed of autonomous nodes that are self- managed without any infrastructure 
[1]. In this way, ad-hoc networks have a dynamic topology such that nodes can easily join or leave the network at 
any time. They have many potential applications, especially, in military and rescue areas such as connecting 
soldiers on the battlefield or establishing a new network in place of a network which collapsed after a disaster like 
an earthquake. Ad-hoc networks are suitable for areas where it is not possible to set up a fixed infrastructure. 
Since the nodes communicate with each other without an infrastructure, they provide the connectivity by 
forwarding packets over themselves. To support this connectivity, nodes use some routing protocols such as 
AODV (Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector), DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) and DSDV (Destination-
Sequenced Distance-Vector). Besides acting as a host, each node also acts as a router to discover a path and 
forward packets to the correct node in the network. As wireless ad-hoc networks lack an infrastructure, they are 
exposed to a lot of attacks [2][3]. One of these attacks is the Black Hole attack. In the Black Hole attack, a 
malicious node absorbs all data packets in itself, similar to a hole which sucks in everything. In this way, all 
packets in the network are dropped. A malicious node dropping all the traffic in the network makes use of the 
vulnerabilities of the route discovery packets of the on demand protocols, such as AODV [4]. In route discovery 
process of AODV protocol, intermediate nodes are responsible to find a fresh path to the destination, sending 
discovery packets to the neighbour nodes [5]. Malicious nodes do not use this process and instead, they 
immediately respond to the source node with false information as though it has fresh enough path to the 
destination. Therefore source node sends its data packets via the malicious node to the destination assuming it is a 
true path. Black Hole attack may occur due to a malicious node which is deliberately misbehaving, as well as a 
damaged node interface. In any case, nodes in the network will constantly try to find a route for the destination, 
which makes the node consume its battery in addition to losing packets. 
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2. ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
The primary goal of routing protocols [6] in ad-hoc network is to establish optimal path (min hops) between 
source and destination with minimum overhead and minimum bandwidth consumption so that packets are 
delivered in a timely manner. A MANET protocol should function effectively over a wide range of networking 
context from small ad-hoc group to larger mobile Multihop networks. As fig 1 shows the categorization of these 
routing protocols.  
 
 
 
Fig 1: Hierarchy of Routing Protocols 
Routing protocols can be divided into proactive, reactive and hybrid protocols, depending on the routing 
topology. Proactive protocols are typically table-driven. Examples of this type include Destination Sequence 
Distance Vector (DSDV). Reactive or source-initiated on-demand protocols, in contrary, do not periodically 
update the routing information. It is propagated to the nodes only when necessary. Example of this type includes 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV). Hybrid protocols make use 
of both reactive and proactive approaches. Example of this type includes Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP), ZHLS, 
etc. 
 
2.1. An Overview of AODV Routing Protocol 
 
Ad Hoc On-Demand Vector Routing (AODV) protocol is a reactive routing protocol for ad hoc and mobile 
networks that maintain routes only between nodes which need to communicate. The AODV routing protocol 
builds on the DSDV algorithm. AODV is an improvement on DSDV because it typically minimizes the number of 
required broadcasts by creating routes on an on-demand basis, as opposed to maintaining a complete list of routes 
as in the DSDV algorithm. The authors of AODV classify it as a pure on-demand route acquisition system, as 
nodes that are not on a selected path do not maintain routing information. That means, the routing messages do 
not contain information about the whole route path, but only about the source and the destination. Therefore, 
routing messages do not have an increasing size. It uses destination sequence numbers to specify how fresh a 
route is (in relation to another), which is used to grant loop freedom. 
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Whenever a node needs to send a packet to a destination for which it has no „fresh enough‟ route (i.e., a valid 
route entry for the destination whose associated sequence number is at least as great as the ones contained in any 
RREQ that the node has received for that destination) it broadcasts a route request (RREQ) message to its 
neighbors. Each node that receives the broadcast sets up a reverse route towards the originator of the RREQ 
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(unless it has a „fresher‟ one).When the intended destination (or an intermediate node that has a „fresh enough‟ 
route to the destination) receives the RREQ, it replies by sending a Route Reply (RREP). It is important to note 
that the only mutable information in a RREQ and in a RREP is the hop count (which is being monotonically 
increased at each hop). The RREP travels back to the originator of the RREQ (this time as a unicast). At each 
intermediate node, a route to the destination is set (again, unless the node has a „fresher‟ route than the one 
specified in the RREP). In the case that the RREQ is replied to by an intermediate node (and if the RREQ had set 
this option), the intermediate node also sends a RREP to the destination. In this way, it can be granted that the 
route path is being set up bi-directionally. In the case that a node receives a new route (by a RREQ or by a RREP) 
and the node already has a route „as fresh‟ as the received one, the shortest one will be up dated. The source node 
starts routing the data packet to the destination node through the neighboring node that first responded with an 
RREP. The AODV protocol is vulnerable to the well-known black hole attack. This is illustrated in figure 2. 
 
3. Black Hole Problem in AODV 
 
Routing protocols are exposed to a variety of attacks. Black hole attack [7] is one such attack and a kind of Denial 
Of Service (DoS) [8][9] in which a malicious node makes use of the vulnerabilities of the route discovery packets 
of the routing protocol to advertise itself as having the shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to 
intercept [10][11]. This attack aims at modifying the routing protocol so that traffic flows through a specific node 
controlled by the attacker. During the Route Discovery process, the source node sends RREQ packets to the 
intermediate nodes to find fresh path to the intended destination. Malicious nodes respond immediately to the 
source node as these nodes do not refer the routing table. The source node assumes that the route discovery 
process is complete, ignores other RREP messages from other nodes and selects the path through the malicious 
node to route the data packets. The malicious node does this by assigning a high sequence number to the reply 
packet. The attacker now drops the received messages instead of relaying them as the protocol requires. 
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 Fig 3: Black hole Attack in AODV 
 
In the above figure 2, imagine a malicious node „M‟. When node „A‟ broadcasts a RREQ packet, nodes „B‟ „D‟ 
and „M‟ receive it. Node „M‟, being a malicious node, does not check up with its routing table for the requested 
route to node „E‟. Hence, it immediately sends back a RREP packet, claiming a route to the destination. Node „A‟ 
receives the RREP from „M‟ ahead of the RREP from „B‟ and „D‟. Node „A‟ assumes that the route through „M‟ 
is the shortest route and sends any packet to the destination through it. When the node „A‟ sends data to „M‟, it 
absorbs all the data and thus behaves like a „Black hole‟. 
In AODV, the sequence number is used to determine the freshness of routing information contained in the 
message from the originating node. When generating RREP message, a destination node compares its current 
sequence number, and the sequence number in the RREQ packet plus one, and then selects the larger one as 
RREPs sequence number. Upon receiving a number of RREP, the source node selects the one with greatest 
sequence number in order to construct a route. But, in the presence of black hole when a source node broadcasts 
the RREQ message for any destination, the black hole node immediately responds with an RREP message that 
includes the highest sequence number and this message is perceived as if it is coming from the destination or from 
a node which has a fresh enough route to the destination. The source assumes that the destination is behind the 
black hole and discards the other RREP packets coming from the other nodes. The source then starts to send out 
its packets to the black hole trusting that these packets will reach the destination. Thus the black hole will attract 
all the packets from the source and instead of forwarding those packets to the destination it will simply discard 
those. Thus the packets attracted by the black hole node will not reach the destination. 
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4. Proposed Solution 
 
We propose an additional route to the intermediate node that replies the RREQ message to check whether the 
route from the intermediate node to the destination node exists or not. When the source node receives the 
FurtherReply (FRp) from the next hop, it extracts the check result from the reply packets. If the result is yes, we 
establish a route to the destination and begin to send out data packets. If the next hop has no route to the inquired 
intermediate node, but has a route to the destination node, we discard the reply packets from the inquired 
intermediate node, and use the new route through the next hop to the destination. At the same time, send out the 
alarm message to whole network to isolate the malicious node. If the next hop has no route to the requested 
intermediate node, and it also has no route to the destination node, the source node initiates another routing 
discovery process, and also sends out an alarm message to isolate the malicious node. Thus we avoid the black 
hole problem, and also prevent the network from further malicious behavior. But here we assume the black hole 
nodes do not work as a group and propose a solution to identify a single black hole. However, the proposed 
method cannot be applied to identifying a cooperative black hole attack involving multiple nodes. We may also 
develop a methodology to identify multiple black hole nodes cooperating as a group. The technique works with 
slightly modified AODV protocol and makes use of the Data Routing Information (DRI) table in addition to the 
cached and current routing tables. A black hole has two properties. First, the node exploits the ad hoc routing 
protocol, such as AODV, to advertise itself as having a valid route to a destination node, even though the route is 
spurious, with the intention of intercepting packets. Second, the node consumes the intercepted packets.  
 
 
4.1. Algorithmic approach to avoid black hole attack in MANETs 
 
 
The solution that we propose here, basically, only modifies the working of the source node without altering 
intermediate and destination nodes. In this method two main things are added namely Data Routing Information 
table and cross checking.  
 
 
Steps: 
 1: Source node broadcasts RREQ 
 2: Source node receives RREP 
 3: if RREP is from destination or a reliable node  
  Then route data packets (source route) 
 4: Else 
   { 
   Send further request and identity of intermediate  
     Node to next Hop node 
Receive further request, next Hop node of current next hop node, Data Routing Information 
entry for next hope node‟s next hop. Put a data routing information entry for current 
intermediate node. 
 5:  if (next hop node is a reliable node) 
      {  
Check intermediate node for black hole using data routing information entry 
    if (intermediate node is not a black hole) 
       route data packets (source route) 
    else 
         { 
     Insecure route  
     Intermediate node is a black hole 
     All the nodes along the reverse path from  
intermediate node to the node that generated  
RREP are black holes (i.e. a malicious node) 
          } 
                    } 
       else 
          Current intermediate node = next hop node 
  }  
6: Repeat step 4 & 5 until intermediate node is not a reliable node 
         
Fig 4: Proposed Algorithm to prevent Black hole Attack 
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4.2. Working Principle 
 
The solution to identify multiple black hole nodes acting in cooperation [12] involves two bits of additional 
information from the nodes responding to the RREQ of source node S. Each node maintains an additional Data 
Routing Information (DRI) table.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Fig 5: Solution to avoid multiple Black hole attack 
In the DRI table, 1 stands for „true‟ and 0 for „false‟. The first bit “From” stands for information on routing data 
packet from the node (in the Node field) while the second bit “Through” stands for information on routing data 
packet through the node (in the Node field). In reference to the example of Figure 3, a sample of the database 
maintained by node 4 is shown in Table 1. The entry 1 0 for node 3 implies that node 4 has routed data packets 
from 3, but has not routed any data packets through 3 (before node 3 moved away from 4). The entry 1 1 for node 
6 implies that, node 4 has successfully routed data packets from and through node 6. The entry 0 0 for node B2 
implies that, node 4 has NOT routed any data packets from or through B2 
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Fig 6: Solution to identify multiple Black hole nodes 
 
We define the following convention for protocol representation in fig 5 & 6. 
 
    RREQ/RREP                 one way propagation 
                Two way propagation                 Route indicator 
 
Cross Checking: In our techniques we rely on reliable nodes (nodes through which the source node has routed 
data) to transfer data packets. The modified AODV protocol and the algorithm for our proposed methodology are 
illustrated in Figure 6. In the protocol, the source node (SN) broadcasts a RREQ message to discover a secure 
route to the destination node. The Intermediate Node (IN) generating the RREP has to provide its Next Hop Node 
(NHN) and its DRI entry for the NHN. Upon receiving RREP message from IN, the source node will check its 
own DRI table to see whether IN is a reliable node. If source node has used IN before to route data, then IN is a 
reliable node and source node starts routing data through IN. Otherwise, IN is unreliable and the source node 
sends FRq message to NHN to check the identity of the IN, and asks NHN: 1) if IN has routed data packets 
through NHN, 2) who is the current NHN‟s next hop to destination, and 3) has the current NHN routed data 
through its own next hop. The NHN in turn responds with FRp message including 1) DRI entry for IN, 2) the next 
hop node of current NHN, and 3) the DRI entry for the current NHN‟s next hop. Based on the FRp message from 
NHN, source node checks whether NHN is a reliable node or not. If source node has routed data through NHN 
before, NHN is reliable; otherwise, unreliable. If NHN is reliable, source node will check whether IN is a black 
hole or not. If the second bit (i.e. IN has routed data through NHN) of the DRI entry from the IN is equal to 1, and 
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the first bit (i.e. NHN has routed data from IN) of the DRI entry from the NHN is equal to 0, IN is a black hole. If 
IN is not a black-hole and NHN is a reliable node, the route is secure, and source node will update its DRI entry 
for IN with 01, and starts routing data via IN. If IN is a black-hole, the source node identifies all the nodes along 
the reverse path from IN to the node that generated the RREP as black hole nodes. Source node ignores any other 
RREP from the black holes and broadcasts the list of cooperative black holes. If NHN is an unreliable node, 
source node treats current NHN as IN and sends FRq to the updated IN‟s next hop node and goes on in a loop 
from steps 4 through 6 in the algorithm. 
 
5. Simulation Environment 
We have implemented Black hole attack in an ns-2 [13] simulator. For our simulations, we use CBR (Constant Bit 
Rate) application, TPC/IP (full duplex communication), IEEE 802.11b MAC and physical channel based on 
statistical propagation model. The simulated network consists of 30 randomly allocated wireless nodes in a 500 by 
500 square meter flat space. The node transmission range is 250-meter power range. Random waypoint model is 
used for scenarios with node mobility. The selected pause time is 30s seconds. A traffic generator was developed 
to simulate constant bit rate (CBR) sources. The size of data payload is 512 bytes. In our scenario we take 30 
nodes in which nodes 1-22 and 25-30 are simple nodes, and node 23 and 24 are malicious node or Black hole 
node. The simulation is done using ns-2, to analyze the performance of the network by varying the nodes mobility 
[14] [15]. The metrics used to evaluate the performance are given below. 
a) Packet Delivery Ratio: The ratio between the number of packets originated by the “application layer” CBR 
sources and the number of packets received by the CBR sink at the final destination.  
b) Throughput: Throughput is the average rate of successful message delivery over a communication channel. 
c) Node Mobility: Node mobility indicates the mobility speed of nodes. 
 
5.1. Result & Discussion 
 
The fig.7 shows the effect to the packet delivery ratio (PDR) measured for the AODV protocol when the node 
mobility is increased. The result shows both the cases, with the black hole attack and without the black hole 
attack. It is measured that the packet delivery ratio dramatically decreases when there is a malicious node in the 
network. For example, the packet delivery ratio is 100% when there is no effect of Black hole attack and when the 
node is moving at the speed 10 m/s. but due to effect of the Black hole attack the packet delivery ratio decreases 
to 82 %, because some of the packets are dropped by the black hole node. 
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Fig 7: Impact of Black hole attack on PDR 
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Fig 8: Impact of Black hole attack on Network Throughput 
 
It is observed from the fig.8 that, the impact of the Black hole attack to the Networks throughput. The throughput 
of the network also decreases due to black hole effect as compared to without the effect of black hole attack. We 
vary the speed of the node and take the result to the different node speed. 
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6. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper we have gone through the routing security issues of MANETs, described the black hole attack that 
can be mounted against a MANET and proposed a feasible solution for it in the AODV protocol. The proposed 
solution can be applied to a) Identify single and multiple black hole nodes cooperating with each other in a 
MANET; and b) Discover secure paths from source to destination by avoiding multiple black hole nodes acting in 
cooperation. Also we showed that the effect of packet delivery ratio and Throughput has been detected with 
respect to the variable node mobility. There is reduction in Packet Delivery Ratio and Throughput. In Black hole 
attack all network traffics are redirected to a specific node or from the malicious node causing serious damage to 
networks and nodes as shown in the result of the simulation. The detection of Black holes in ad hoc networks is 
still considered to be a challenging task. 
We simulated the Black Hole Attack in the Ad-hoc Networks and investigated its affects. In our study, we used 
the AODV routing protocol. But the other routing protocols could be simulated as well. All routing protocols are 
expected to present different results. Therefore, the best routing protocol for minimizing the Black Hole Attack 
may be determined. 
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